Assessing the scope for insurance in rural communities usually requires a structural model of household behavior under risk. One of the few empirical applications of such models is the study by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) who conclude that Indian farmers in the ICRISAT villages would not benefit from the introduction of formal weather insurance. In this paper we investigate how models such as theirs can be estimated from panel data on production and assets. We show that if assets can take only a limited number of values the coefficients of the model cannot be estimated with reasonable precision. We also show that this can affect the conclusion that insurance would not be welfare improving.
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Introduction
Insecurity is a key aspect of poverty. There now is substantial evidence that exposure to risk (in the absence of well-functioning financial markets) is often reflected in very large volatility of a household's consumption over time (e.g. Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Dercon, 2005) . There still is little clarity on the policy implications of such churning. For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) argue that rural households need micro credit, but Dercon (2005) favors formal insurance arrangements. While many insurance schemes are now being piloted (including rainfall insurance in Ethiopia and option contracts on coffee prices in several African countries) very little is known of their costs and benefits relative to existing risk coping institutions. To assess new policy initiatives in this area we need to know more about their welfare effects.
In choosing risk-coping strategies households face, of course, a trade-off between the mean and the volatility of their income. For example, a household can reduce the volatility of its income through crop diversification, but it will thereby lower its mean income by foregoing the gains from specialization. The household thereby pays an implicit risk premium and this must be taken into account in the evaluation of policy interventions, such as micro credit, price stabilization or formal insurance.
The evaluation should assess not only the change in volatility as a result of the intervention, but also the change in the (implicit) premium. Households can also use consumption smoothing by accumulating or decumulating assets to cope with risk. 1 Here the implicit premium is the loss of production as a result of using assets for this purpose.
Ideally, the scope for insurance can be evaluated by comparing villages with and without insurance where treatment villages have been selected randomly and the distribution of shocks is known. Alternatively, if locations differ in risk exposure this can be exploited as a natural experiment to infer how behavior would change under insurance. Clearly, the villages must then be similar in all other respects.
Matching or differencing offers some scope for relaxing this requirement but only if all relevant variables are observed. In practice unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be a major problem. In that case there is no alternative to estimating a structural model, using panel data. Such a model can be used to derive how agents would behave if insurance were available, even if no agent had been observed in that situation. Obviously, this requires estimation of the model's structural parameters.
An important advantage of this procedure is that the researcher does not need to know the distribution of the shocks to which the households are exposed;
estimates of the parameters characterizing that distribution will be generated as part of the estimation procedure.
Lucas (2003) suggested on the basis of a back-of-envelope calculation that insurance could not have a substantial effect on growth. However, he considered a situation with much less risk than is common in many developing countries.
Unfortunately, for developing countries there are few empirical studies.
A notable exception is the famous paper by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) (henceforth RW). They estimated a structural model using the ICRISAT data collected in three Indian villages. experiments to derive the distribution of the structural coefficients. We find, as expected, very large errors. It turns out that in this class of models the RW conclusion as to the welfare effects of insurance is not robust. Section 4 concludes.
Consider the following deterministic intertemporal optimization problem
where c is consumption, k the capital stock, ) (c u the instantaneous utility function and β a discount factor. The usual interpretation of the model is that output
can be consumed or used as input into next period's production. Note the absence of a depreciation term
: to get a more compact notation the production function ) (k f represents the real value of output plus the afterproduction value of the asset. A solution t kˆ, ,... 1 = t to the optimization problem can be characterized by an investment function ϕ , with
We will assume that the solution is unique. Note that the optimization problem is stationary, implying that ϕ does not depend on t .
There are several ways to extend the decision problem to a stochastic framework.
One possibility is to allow for random shocks in ) (k f and to maximize the expected value of summed discounted utility with respect to investment policies. If the shocks are serially independent the optimal policy is again an investment function
In the deterministic case the functions ) (⋅ f and ) (⋅ ϕ can be identified from a sufficient number of different 0 k observations and subsequent observations on the capital stock and output. (Note that there is no need to observe consumption since it follows from ) (
.) The question arises whether observation of ) ( t k f (subject to shocks) and t kˆ is sufficient to recover the behavioral parameters of the process, namely the discount factor β and the parameters of
The answer is affirmative: by integrating the Euler conditions for an optimal accumulation path we can normally recover β as well as the utility function (over the relevant part of its domain and up to an affine transformation).
2 Knowledge of the behavioral parameters allows us to study counterfactual situations, such as the introduction of insurance.
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Now suppose that t k is restricted to a limited number ( n ) of integer values. RW use both methods. They assume a finite decision horizon, leading to heterogeneity in asset holding policies across decision makers of different age.
Irreversibility of the installation of a pump leads to a shift in the production function for pump owners.
Whether heterogeneity can indeed be used to solve the estimation problem is an open question.
6 RW in fact fix the value of one of the three behavioral parameters, the discount factor. Further, as we will show for a simplified version of their model, but with similar parameter values, heterogeneity introduced by pump ownership does little to improve the situation since conditionally on pump-less threshold values, behavioral parameters have almost no effect on pump-inclusive thresholds.
Also, age-based heterogeneity has very little effect on investment behavior except for households with elderly heads; this gives such households inordinate weight in the estimation procedure.
We conclude that estimation of behavioral parameters underlying an accumulation process is inherently difficult if the asset involved can take only a few discrete values. The problem can be solved by putting additional constraints on the parameters, but any counterfactual analyses based on the estimated parameters must then be checked for robustness against such constraints. We also suggest that the identification problem can be solved if the asset becomes continuous.
6 Rust (1994) provides detailed discussion of the identification of dynamic discrete choice models, presenting sufficient conditions under which the model can be identified and a simple and general estimation theory is available. One of the restrictions required in his discussion is that shocks enter into the utility function additively, which is violated in the RW model. As Rust (1994) mentions, no general estimation theory exists for this case.
Simulations
For our simulations we use a simplified version of the RW model. 7 We first describe the model and then discuss the simulations.
The model
In the simplified RW model each agent solves: where the agent's instantaneous utility function is characterised by the parameter Note from (1) and (3) that the insurance arrangement will pay out only to households without cattle: a household with min c c < will have to sell its cattle before it is entitled to consumption support since c is defined as the difference between wealth at hand ( w ) which includes the cattle asset and the investment.
The optimal policy function will depend on τ and P . Given these two parameters the function will involve two threshold values for wealth at hand, 
Simulations set-up
We impose the following values (based on the RW estimates) for the three structural coefficients: T is 70 periods. We solve the investment thresholds w by using backward recursion which is discussed in Rust (1994) as the main solution method for finite-horizon models. With these parameter values the investment thresholds w are virtually insensitive to age τ for all but the oldest households.
We have therefore eliminated age heterogeneity, imposing given the values of all other parameters and the true underlying model specification.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
, and zero otherwise. Similarly for
. With this notation the likelihood contribution of a household is proportional to
11 Eight is also the number of periods in RW. RW do not mention the number of households, but the ICRISAT data set contains 30 medium-size households with two or more observations. RW use the data from this medium-size group of households. 12 This is, of course, a simplification; in practice there will be covariance, e.g. in the case of weather shocks. The bounds have been chosen to make the thresholds estimated precisely. Since 13 Note that
. 14 The interpolation method used is a trivariate version of the "Four Point Formula" in Abramowitz and Stegun (1972, p. 882) . the estimates of β , γ and min c should be close to their true values if they could be estimated from the model the choice of different bounds do not make difference to the estimation of the parameters.
Results
With the above choice of model and parameters it turns out that the threshold values 2 , 1 w are virtually insensitive to parameters β and γ . Hence it is impossible to estimate these parameters with any accuracy. We find that γ tends to settle on one of the bounds and β tends to stay very close to its initial value. On the other hand, min c can be estimated fairly accurately. The mean and standard deviation determined from 100 simulations are 1444.7 and 80.3.
Recall that the heterogeneity in pump ownership raises the number of thresholds above the number of parameters so that the problem discussed in section 2 of having to recover three coefficients from two threshold values does not arise. 16 The values shown in the Table are calculated under the assumption that no household will acquire a pump: the first three household types remain pumpless throughout.
The Table shows that the first two types of households (those who initially have no pump and at most one bullock) would not be willing to give up the informal insurance arrangement (which guarantees a consumption level min c ) in exchange for AFI. The reason is simple: under AFI they would no longer enjoy the positive income shocks which they experience under the (asymmetric) informal insurance 15 Recall that this measure is biased since (as RW recognise) the cost of the informal arrangement would be reflected in a premium which would not have to be paid under AFI. Since RW do not know this cost (which is reflected in ) (k α ) they ignore it in the comparison: hence under AFI the household continues to pay the same premium. This is a major issue: given the choice between AFI (i.e. constant consumption) and an arrangement where the household would receive positive shocks but (as a result of the min c floor) no negative shocks it might well prefer the latter if the two schemes did not differ in cost. This would, obviously, say nothing about the desirability of AFI. Rather, it would reflect the failure to model explicitly the cost of the min c scheme. 16 The welfare changes can only be compared within rows since different rows correspond to different preferences. with the informal arrangement forever, but were instead offered the option of switching to insurance then welfare gains might be positive even for the first two types of households.
Since β cannot be estimated with precision, Table 1 implies that any policy conclusion on the welfare effect of introducing formal insurance will not be robust.
If β is estimated (in a relatively small sample) it may easily settle on one of the two boundary values (with opposite policy conclusions). Conversely, if β is fixed (as in RW, who set 0.95 = β ) the policy conclusion is thereby fixed as well.
Conclusion
There is a renewed interest in insurance mechanisms to assist rural households in risk coping. It is rarely possible to evaluate such interventions through (quasi) experimental evaluation methods. In principle estimating a structural model of household behavior under risk (using panel data) is a viable alternative. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) applied this approach to the ICRISAT data and found that insurance would not be welfare improving. In this paper we have investigated the robustness of this policy conclusion. We have considered a class of models of household behavior under risk where assets can take only a small number of values. This severely restricts the scope for estimating structural coefficients. In the RW case heterogeneity could solve this problem but we have shown (for a simplified version of their model) that in small samples two of the coefficients cannot be estimated with reasonable precision in spite of this heterogeneity. Since the policy conclusion on the desirability of introducing formal insurance is sensitive to the value of these coefficients, the conclusion is probably not robust. This does not mean that we cannot use panel data to assess the scope for insurance. Rather, it implies that if asset data indeed take only a small number of values (relative to the number of parameters to be estimated) then estimation requires heterogeneity which (unlike the heterogeneity allowed for by RW) leads to independent variation in threshold values. The procedure we have described can easily establish whether this condition is satisfied. An alternative is to treat assets as continuous variables, e.g., by using livestock (an aggregate of cattle, goats, sheep etc.) rather than bullocks as the capital stock. 
